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Abstract 
 
Some argue that genetic enhancements and environmental enhancements are not 
importantly different: environmental enhancements such as private schools and chess 
lessons are simply the old-school way to have a designer baby.  I argue that there is an 
important distinction between the two practices – a distinction that makes state 
restrictions on genetic enhancements more justifiable than state restrictions on 
environmental enhancements.  The difference is that parents have no settled expectations 
about genetic enhancements. 
 
 
 Genetic enhancements and expectations 
 
 
Maybe genetic enhancements like IQ and memory boosts – when, if ever, they 
become possible – are not so different from environmental enhancements like private 
schools, tutors, camps, and lessons.  Private schools and chess lessons are simply the old-
school way to have a designer baby.   Or at least so some argue.   
May a parent use genetic enhancements?  It is likely that some parents will want 
to.  But the question I want to discuss here is this: are there any grounds on which the rest 
of us might be justified in using the law and other institutions to prevent parents from 
using genetic enhancements – especially when we do not prevent them from using 
environmental enhancements for the same purpose?  Parents are usually understood to 
have broad freedom with respect to the measures they can take with their children; an 
important question concerns whether parents should have that same latitude with respect 
to new genetic technologies. 
 One obvious answer focuses on risk: for some time these new genetic 
technologies may lack the relative safety of environmental interventions.  But eventually 
risk will diminish and questions about access will return.   
 A second answer justifies restricting access based on putative intrinsic differences 
between genetic and environmental interventions.  Environmental interventions do 
nothing more than bring out the best in individuals, while genetic interventions change 
the identity of the individual; and this distinction justifies stricter laws and policies 
regarding the use of genetic measures – or so the argument goes.  This second answer has 
come under increasing criticism. 
 An even more common target of criticism is a claimed distinction between 
treatments for disease and enhancements.  Genetic interventions that treat diseases should 
be available and legally permissible, but not those that enhance, some have argued.  But it 
has proven difficult to distinguish treatments from enhancements in any stable way.  And 
in any case, the distinction would not address our question, since both classes of 
intervention that interest us are enhancements. 
 I want to defend a different answer.  Both types of intervention exacerbate 
existing inequalities.  Many environmental measures that significantly increase a child’s 
economic and social opportunities are available only to the wealthy, and this will also 
certainly be the case with new genetic measures.  Exacerbating inequality is morally 
worrisome, but this alone is not enough to distinguish between the environment and 
genetics, since both kinds of enhancement can make inequality worse.  However, there 
should be stronger constraints on parental use of genetic interventions than on 
environmental measures.  An important difference between the two, setting aside risk and 
claimed identity-changing issues, concerns expectations.  Parents have settled 
expectations in the case of environmental interventions: they have formed and initiated 
plans and projects around the freedom to send their children to certain schools and 
lessons.  No such expectations yet exist for new genetic technologies, precisely because 
they are new. 
 
THE CONSISTENCY ARGUMENT 
 Some think that consistency demands that we treat genetic and environmental 
interventions the same.  They concede that these interventions increase inequality; and 
they also concede that this inequality is morally undesirable.  But the fact that parents 
already have broad rights to use environmental means to improve their children’s 
opportunities seems to entail that genetic means for the same purpose must also be 
equally unrestrained.  The abstracted argument seems to be this: 
 
The Consistency Argument 
 
1. X is a state-permitted practice that results in some economic inequality.  
2. Y is a new practice that is expected to result in some economic inequality.  
3. If X and Y are expected to be relevantly similar practices, then the state must 
also permit Y.  
4. X and Y are expected to be relevantly similar practices.  
5. Therefore, the state must also permit Y.  
 
Here “X” is the use of environmental interventions to improve one’s children, and “Y” is 
the use of genetic interventions to improve one’s children.i   
 Fans of consistency who also worry about inequality may choose to take the 
argument in a different direction: they may think that both sorts of intervention should be 
impermissible.  In its extreme form, this argument strips parents of any rights to shape 
their children at all.  A less extreme form puts limits on parental shaping rights when the 
inequality they promote is above some significant threshold.  For now, I want to concede 
instead that the state is correct to allow parents to use environmental interventions that 
promote inequality. 
 The first two premises of the consistency argument seem plausible.  But some will 
want to question premise four: some will think there is an important intrinsic difference 
between the types of interventions.  Genetic interventions change an individual’s identity, 
the argument goes, while environmental interventions do not.  Environmental means 
                                                
i
 Something like this argument seems implicit in Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, et al.[1]  The authors have their 
own worries about this argument. 
merely “bring out the best” that is already inherent in a child without changing who he or 
she is.  By contrast, genetic interventions change something more fundamental and 
essential to the child’s identity. 
 But this argument relies on a tendentious and simplistic notion of personal 
identity.  First, it is not clear that the child has a singular identity at the points of its 
existence that interest us – at least, a singular identity in the sense needed for the 
argument to work.  A fetus or newborn has a set of genetic predispositions, none of which 
necessarily add up to a single, clear individual.  Altering these predispositions would not 
necessarily change who the being is, because there is not yet a stable, single being to be 
changed.  The case is even clearer in the case of pre-conception interventions: here there 
is certainly no single individual who might be altered.  Second, even in a stable, single 
individual, genetic changes would not necessarily constitute an identity change.  Suppose 
we were able to boost your immune system; you would not think you were a different 
individual if this procedure were performed on you.  And it would not seem to matter to 
personal identity if the procedure were environmental (say, a vaccination) or genetic.ii 
 Instead I want to challenge the third premise of the consistency argument.  
Suppose we concede that genetic and environmental interventions are relevantly similar 
practices: there is nothing intrinsic to each that lets us distinguish them when it comes to 
the question of what, through institutions and the law, we should allow others to do.  But 
it is not the case that we can make no other distinction here.  I believe that an important 
difference between the two lies instead outside them, in the social practices that have 
                                                
ii
 For a similar argument, see Buchanan, Brock, Daniels et al.[1] pp. 159-161.  I do think there is a better 
argument for an intrinsic different between the two types of interventions.  There is a sense in which 
genetic interventions change the range of capabilities and attributes an emerging individual might have in a 
way quite different from environmental interventions.   
formed around one but not the other.  In other words, though relevantly similar 
intrinsically, the use of these interventions is importantly different extrinsically and 
externally. 
 The external difference is best captured by the notion of expectations.  
Expectations are beliefs about futures states of affairs around which people choose 
projects and structure their lives.  Some expectations are unreasonable, and some are 
fleeting: these are probably not morally important.  But reasonable, stable, settled 
expectations can matter a great deal.  And it is the moral weight of settled expectations 
that explains why the state is permitted to make more intrusive restrictions on access to 
emerging genetic technologies.  People have settled expectations about environmental 
interventions such as private schools and tutors; but they do not have these expectations 
about forthcoming genetic interventions.  The notion of expectations lets us reject the 
third premise of the consistency argument and defend instead what we might call the 
“Pre-Emption Principle:” 
 
The Pre-Emption Principle 
 
 The state is more justified in restricting one of a class of relevantly similar 
practices if: 
 
   (i)  The practice would substantively worsen existing economic inequality; and  
 (ii) The practice is new, such that no settled expectations have been formed on it.  
 
 
EXPECTATIONS 
 
 Expectations are an important but underappreciated factor in normative ethics.iii  
We characterized expectations as beliefs about futures states of affairs around which 
                                                
iii
 But see Leslie P. Francis’s work on expectations.[2, 3] Although I concede in this paper that parent 
expectations about environmental interventions can be reasonable and morally weighty, Francis argues for 
people choose projects and structure their lives.  Why should we think they have moral 
weight? 
 A central argument for the importance of expectations concerns the value of 
autonomy.  We take it as morally weighty that rational beings can choose ends and 
pursue them in certain uncoerced ways.  We value both the capacity itself and specific 
exercises of that capacity.  The weight autonomy has is not absolute: the autonomous 
choices of different agents can clash, and there may be other relevant moral factors as 
well.  But autonomy is morally important – even for consequentialists, who take it as 
often instrumentally valuable. 
 Expectations have weight because they are tied to autonomy: agents choose 
projects on the understanding that social conditions and other matters will stay the same, 
or at least change in predictable ways.  Agents cannot meaningfully exercise their 
autonomy in the absence of some sense of how their choices will turn out.  Valuing 
autonomy means creating and protecting the conditions under which it can be 
meaningfully exercised.  So expectations are morally important. 
  The claim is not that all reasonable expectations must be met: bad luck – natural 
disasters and accidents, for instance – can destroy even modest projects.  And the claim is 
not that social conditions must never change; that would be both impossible and 
hopelessly conservative.  But broad stability and reliability in social conditions is 
important – especially when the autonomous choices at issue concern having and raising 
children, among the most intimate and personal choices human agents have.  Parents who 
attempt to improve their children’s capabilities and opportunities operate squarely within 
                                                                                                                                              
more caution: parental expectations about private schools might be weak or negligible in light of the 
background injustice of great disparities in wealth and opportunity.   
this set of intimate, personal choices.  Expectations will matter here if they matter 
anywhere.  Under current social conditions, parents can send their children to private 
schools, involve them in sports organizations and chess clubs, provide them with music 
lessons and advanced technology, and improve their health through promoting exercise 
and proper diet.  Any and all of these interventions can give children competitive 
economic and social advantages – advantages that generally translate into greater wealth 
and well-being.  In the aggregate, these interventions can promote widespread inequality, 
something morally worrisome in the degree to which it currently exists. 
 Among these environmental interventions, we might think some more protected 
against state and institutional interference than others.  Some interventions are 
particularly personal and close to parents – passing on a love of books or music or 
activity, for instance.  These and other interventions are usually available to all parents, 
regardless of income or social status.  Promoting exercise and good diet need not require 
more than a modest income (although even here the least well-off can be victims of poor 
education concerning diet and health).  But other environmental interventions are only 
available to the well-off.  Private schools are the paradigmatic case.  It is here that the 
consistency argument is most relevant: if we allow well-off parents to use these means to 
help their children, why should we not also allow well-off parents to purchase genetic 
interventions for the same purpose? 
 Expectations provide a crucial answer.  Generations of parents have been able to 
plan their lives and their children’s lives around the existence of private education.  
Morally weighty expectations reside in non-parents as well: participants in private 
schools, from local private elementary schools to Ivy League behemoths, have structured 
their lives around the continued existence of these institutions.  Donors to these 
institutions expect their contributions to promote certain ends even after they die.  But the 
central case concerns parents, since the most important expectations are those that 
concern relationships with one’s offspring. 
 A controversial example of the use of expectations appears in the opinion written 
by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter for Casey v. Planned Parenthood (1992).  
Casey was of course a direct challenge to Roe v. Wade, and many predicted that the Court 
might directly overturn Roe.  Instead Roe’s “central holding” was upheld, although with a 
significant shift, from allowing restrictions on abortion only when there exist compelling 
reasons, to allowing restrictions on abortion when these restrictions do not impose an 
“undue burden” on the right to choose.  Most important for our purposes are the justices’ 
arguments in Casey’s joint opinion.  O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter might not have 
voted for Roe in 1973; but they were unwilling to overturn its central holding because 
people have formed settled expectations about the choice to have an abortion.  The 
justices say that to overturn Roe would deny the fact that 
 
“…for two decades of economic and social developments, [people] have 
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of 
themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in 
the event that contraception should fail.  The ability of women to participate 
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their 
ability to control their reproductive lives.”[4] 
 
The fact that people have “ordered their thinking and living around”[4] Roe puts 
constraints on what the state may do in this case.  Whatever we think about the rest of 
Casey (including the “undue burden” standard, and what Scalia claims is an improperly 
selective use of stare decisis), the justices are right to concern themselves with 
expectations. 
 Analogously, the fact that people have “ordered their thinking and living around” 
the existence and availability of environmental interventions to improve their children 
puts some constraints on state intrusion.  These constraints are defeasible, and I defend no 
particular position here about their strength.  But a crucial point is this: people have no 
such settled expectations about genetic interventions.  Genetic measures aimed at 
increasing a child’s abilities and opportunities are still largely theoretical, and those that 
do exist – sex selection, for instance – are still new and controversial enough that few 
have made personal and intimate project choices based on them.   
Expectations limit what the state can do to reduce side effects of environmental 
interventions that promote economic inequality; but there are fewer such expectations-
based limits on the state in the case of genetic interventions.  Even if there are other 
factors that argue for limits on the state, proponents of the consistency argument simply 
fail to notice the moral weight of expectations.  State restrictions on genetic 
enhancements are more justifiable than state restrictions on environmental enhancements. 
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